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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
New York Court of Appeals adopts standard deferential to trial
courts in assessing prosecution's explanations for exercise of pe-
remptory challenges
Historically, juries have existed to promote fairness in Anglo-
American trials.' Selection of a jury occurs during voir dire,2 where
See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(e), (g), at 28-30 (1985) [here-
inafter LAFAvE]. Under the sixth amendment, applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment, criminal defendants "shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. Participation of laypersons on juries protects a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial and helps maintain the appearance of fairness in the judicial pro-
cess to the community. See LAFAvE, supra; see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, TmE AMERICAN
JURY 3 (1966) (jury "represents a deep commitment to the use of laymen in the administra-
tion of justice"). The appearance of an equitable system of justice is preserved by lay par-
ticipation since unpopular judicial decisions will be attributable to neutral community par-
ticipants and not to a conspiring profession of lawyers or an oppressive government. See
LAFAVE, supra.
In both civil and criminal trials, the jury serves "to assure a fair and equitable resolu-
tion of factual issues." Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973). "[Tlhe essential feature
of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the com-
monsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence." Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
2 See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REP-
RESENTATIVE PANELS 145 (1977). Literally meaning "to speak the truth," voir dire "denotes
the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys make of prospective jurors to
determine their qualification and suitability to serve as jurors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1575 (6th ed. 1990). In both state and federal courts, the examination of potential jurors
"during the voir dire sets the stage for peremptory challenges as well as challenges for
cause." J. VAN DYKE, supra. By questioning prospective jurors, and allowing each party to
exercise their respective challenges, the voir dire process ensures "a fair and impartial jury."
See V. STARR & M. MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 2.1.10, at 39 (1985) [hereinafter STARR].
Prior to the voir dire stage of the trial, a venire is drawn from members of the commu-
nity who are eligible to serve as jurors. See Comment, The Cross-Section Requirement and
Jury Impartiality, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1555, 1559-60 (1985). The term "venire" designates
"[t]he group of citizens from whom a jury is chosen in a given case." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990). Federal courts compile a venire in accordance with the Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (1988). This Act is designed
to provide litigants with a panel representative of the community where the action will be
tried. Id. § 1861.
In New York, the Commissioner of Jurors randomly selects potential jurors from vari-
ous state and local compilations, including voter lists, licensed and registered car owners,
and taxpayers. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 506 (McKinney Supp. 1990). The venire must represent
a fair cross-section of the community pursuant to the sixth amendment, as applied to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-70
(1979) (exclusion of women from jury violated cross-section requirement).
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potential jurors may be dismissed either for cause s or perempto-
rily.4 Peremptory challenges can be exercised without any justifica-
tion,' and, therefore, are open to potential abuse by prosecutors
who seek to rid a jury of members of a minority defendant's race,
gender, or ethnic group.' In Batson v. Kentucky,7 the United
States Supreme Court determined that a defendant may establish
a prima facie case of purposeful jury selection discrimination by
showing "that he is a member of a cognizable racial group,.., that
S'See STARR, supra note 2, § 2.1.11. Every challenge for cause must be accompanied by
an express reason why the particular juror should be excluded. See id. The United States
Supreme Court has defined challenges for cause as having a "narrowly specified, provable
and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), over-
ruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). Although either party is entitled to an
unlimited number of challenges for cause, specific grounds for exercisinig challenges for
cause are circumscribed by state statutes. See LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 21.3(c), at 844. The
judge must agree that the particular basis for disqualification has been adequately demon-
strated before the challenging party may remove a potential juror for cause. See id.; J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 2, at 140. In New York, challenges for cause are governed by the Criminal
Procedure Law. See CPL § 270.20 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
4 See STARR, supra note 2, § 2.1.12. In contrast to challenges for cause, peremptory
challenges may be employed to dismiss a prospective juror without justification or judicial
approval. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.3(d), at 847; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2. Similar to
most state rules governing the use of peremptory challenges, New York places a limit on the
number of challenges exercised without cause according to the type of crime charged. See
CPL § 270.25(2) (McKinney 1982) (20 peremptory challenges available to each side if crime
is Class A felony, 15 if Class B or C felony, and 10 for all other crimes). See generally
Comment, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge in Civil Action: Clark v. City of Bridgeport,
61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 155 (1986) (general discussion of peremptory challenges).
I See J. RASICOT, JURY SELECTION, BODY LANGUAGE & THE VISUAL TRIAL 93 (1983)
("[p]eremptory challenges need not be defended once established by the state legislature, as
long as statutory provisions have been followed"); see also supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987) (government
struck five out of seven African Americans during voir dire); United States v. Gordon, 817
F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (prosecution exercised six peremptories to remove all Afri-
can Americans from jury), vacated in part, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487
U.S. 1265 (1988); State v. Gonzalez, 206 Conn. 391, 396, 538 A.2d 210, 213 (1988) (Hispanic
defendant challenged discriminatory nature of removal of all Hispanics from petit jury).
The wholesale exclusion of disfavored minority groups from juries, particularly African
Americans, has been a prevalent practice among prosecutors since the advent of peremptory
challenges. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150. See generally A. SCHAUFELBERGER, BLACKS
AND THE TRIAL BY JURY 106-27 (1973) (historical look at discrimination against African
Americans in jury selection process).
Due to its historical significance, the peremptory challenge has become "one of the most
important rights secured to an accused." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United
States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)). However, the United States Supreme Court has refused to
recognize peremptories as a federal constitutional right. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91; Swain,
380 U.S. at 243.
7 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1990] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race . . . [and] that
these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude.., on account of
... race."8 The Court further noted that once a defendant makes
this initial showing, the burden would shift to the prosecution to
come forward with a neutral explanation.. Recently, however, in
People v. Hernandez,10 the New York Court of Appeals held that
although the defendant, a Latino, had established a prima facie
case of discrimination under the Batson standard, the prosecution
had provided adequate, facially neutral reasons for the exercise of
its peremptories excluding potential jurors with Latino surnames.1
In Hernandez, the Latino defendant faced charges which in-
cluded attempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon. 2
8 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. In Batson, the Court expressly overruled Swain v. Ala-
bama, by removing the "crippling burden of proof" imposed upon defendants. Id. at 92.
Under Swain, a defendant was required to prove a previous pattern of discrimination by the
prosecution in its exercise of peremptories. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 224-28. The Court in
Batson allowed a defendant to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by
the prosecution based solely on evidence of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in
the very case before the Court, without having to demonstrate a pattern of discrimination.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Under the Batson standard, a defendant has the initial burden
of raising an inference that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges discrim-
inatorily. Id. at 96-97. To meet this burden, the defendant first must demonstrate that he is
a member of a "cognizable racial group," and that the prosecution has utilized its peremp-
tory challenges to dismiss members of the defendant's race or ethnic group. Id. at 96. Sec-
ond, the defendant is entitled to a presumption that peremptory challenges are subject to
abuse by prosecutors seeking to discriminate. Id. Third, the defendant may utilize these and
any other facts to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. Id. When the defendant
has satisfied the court that an inference of discrimination has been raised, the burden then
shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence which will rebut the inference. Id. at 97. If the
prosecution fails to produce a sufficiently neutral explanation for each peremptorily chal-
lenged juror, the defendant will prevail. See Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Chal-
lenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CrM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 61 (1988). Should the prosecution proffer a satisfactory explanation, how-
ever, the court's inquiry would continue. Id. In this instance, the trial court would deter-
mine whether the defendant has carried his ultimate burden of proving a racially discrimi-
natory exercise of peremptories by the state based upon an analysis of all the relevant facts.
Id.
, See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
10 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, cert. granted in part, 59 U.S.L.W.
3275 (1990).
'1 Id. at 353, 552 N.E.2d at 621-22, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 85-86.
12 Id. at 353, 552 N.E.2d at 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 85. The defendant's conviction arose
from his attempt to shoot and kill a female acquaintance and her mother as they left a
Brooklyn restaurant. Id. at 353, 552 N.E.2d at 622, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 86. Stray bullets from
the defendant's gun hit and injured two other restaurant patrons. Id.
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At the close of voir dire, the defendant's attorney objected to the
prosecutor's use of four peremptory challenges to remove all pro-
spective jurors with Latino surnames and moved for a mistrial.13
Applying the Batson standard, the Supreme Court, Kings County,
concluded that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination was
sufficiently established, and shifted the burden to the prosecution
to provide neutral explanations for the use of each peremptory
challenge. 14 The prosecution argued that the Latino jurors were ex-
cused, not because of their ethnic identity, but because they might
be unable to refer solely to the official translation of Spanish testi-
mony without relying on their own Spanish language proficiency.15
Based on this argument, the court held that the prosecution had
provided an adequate, facially neutral justification to rebut the in-
ference of purposeful discrimination and denied the defendant's
motion for a mistrial.'" The defendant was subsequently con-
victed.17 The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed and
granted leave to appeal.' 8
Upon further review, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the courts below, holding that the prosecution had proffered a
valid nondiscriminatory justification for the exercise of its peremp-
13 Id. Two of the challenged jurors were dismissed, according to the prosecutor, because
they were immediate relatives of individuals formerly prosecuted by the district attorney's
office responsible for prosecuting Hernandez. See id. Although the defendant did not chal-
lenge the dismissal of these jurors, he did challenge the removal of the two other Latino
jurors. See id. at 354, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
'4 See id. at 356, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
See id. at 354, 552 N.E.2d at 622, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 86. Pursuant to the rule enunci-
ated in Batson, "the prosecutor cannot simply state that rejecting the jurors rested on the
assumption they might be favorably disposed to the defendant because of shared race or
ethnic similarities." Id. at 355, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87. The prosecution's
explanations must be completely neutral. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Several courts have
composed a generic list of acceptable neutral reasons, including "current and past employ-
ment, general appearance and demeanor, previous jury service, and the absence or presence
of apparent prejudice." United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1989). Further-
more, the Second Circuit has accorded district courts great deference by reviewing the pros-
ecution's proffered explanations under a "clearly erroneous" standard. See United States v.
Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
'8 See Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 354, 552 N.E.2d at 623, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
17 See id. at 354, 552 N.E.2d at 622, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 86. The defendant was convicted
on two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, one count of criminal possession
of a weapon in the second degree, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree. People v. Hernandez, 140 A.D.2d 543, 543, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (2d Dep't
1988), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 622, 553 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1990).
18 See Hernandez, 140 A.D.2d at 543, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
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tory challenges. 19 Writing for the court, Judge Bellacosa explained
that the duty to evaluate the prosecution's explanation rested with
the trial court, since it was essentially a factual determination."
The Hernandez court rationalized its acceptance of the prosecu-
tor's explanation by emphasizing that it is the jurors' responsibility
"to decide a case on the official evidence before them, not on their
own personal expertise or language proficiency." 21 The majority ex-
pressly rejected the more probing analysis offered by the dissent
which advocated an enhanced standard of scrutiny, claiming such a
standard would eviscerate the peremptory challenge by transform-
ing it, sub silentio, into a challenge for cause. 2 Grounding its deci-
sion in equal protection terms, the court refused to diverge from
federal law; it concluded that the outcome would be the same
under either the Federal or the New York State Constitution.23
Judge Titone, in his concurring opinion, expressed skepticism
over the ability of any judicially prescribed standard to prevent the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges effectively.24 Noting a
fundamental inconsistency between peremptory challenges, which
need not be justified, and the neutral explanations required under
Batson, Judge Titone reiterated Justice Marshall's concurring sen-
timent in Batson and suggested the elimination of peremptory
challenges altogether.25
'9 See Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 353, 552 N.E.2d at 621-22, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 85-86.
20 See id. at 356-57, 552 N.E.2d at 623-24, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88. Judge Bellacosa relied
on Batson. Id. In Batson Justice Powell stated that "[s]ince the trial judge's findings ...
largely will turn on evaluations of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those
findings great deference." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. Judge Bellacosa further reasoned that
if judges of the state's highest judicial tribunal could not agree as to whether or not the
prosecutor was acting in good faith, the court should refrain from encouraging a redetermi-
nation of this factual issue at the appellate level. See Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 357, 552
N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
" Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 357-58, 552 N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88. The court,
however, cautioned prosecutors that "pretextual maneuvering" was unacceptable, and care-
fully limited its holding to "the circumstances presented," suggesting that explanations
more obviously contrived than those offered here might be deemed insufficient. Id.
22 Id. at 357, 552 N.E.2d at 624-25, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88-89.
23 See id.
2 Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 358-59, 552 N.E.2d at 625, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (Titone, J.,
concurring). Judge Titone pointed to the fact that "racist motivations are easily concealed,"
and that even an enhanced scrutiny might not necessarily "be effective in eradicating racial
bias in the jury selection process." Id. at 359, 552 N.E.2d at 625, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (Titone,
J., concurring).
" See id. at 359-60, 552 N.E.2d at 625-26, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90 (Titone, J., concur-
ring). Judge Titone, declining the dissent's invitation to develop "an authoritative body of
state law," urged a legislative response instead. Id. (Titone, J., concurring). In dissent, Judge
1990]
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In a scathing dissent, Judge Kaye, joined by Judge Hancock,
accused the majority of rendering illusory the equal protection
principles articulated in Batson.2 6 Judge Kaye further argued for a
decision based on independent state constitutional grounds as a
means of best serving the citizens of New York and assisting the
federal judiciary in developing this area of the law.27 Questioning
both the legitimacy of the district attorney's concern for juror re-
sponsibility,28 and the sincerity of his explanation, 29 Judge Kaye
strongly urged that a standard of "enhanced scrutiny" be used in
evaluating the prosecution's proffered explanations."0
It appears that the Hernandez court misconstrued the Batson
standard in an effort to avoid unduly complicating the law in this
area.31 However, the Hernandez court has "surrendered at the out-
set" its responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of all
New York State citizens," in favor of a statutorily codified histori-
Kaye argued that since peremptory challenges are essentially creatures of state statutes, the
issue is ideally suited for determination under state law. Id. at ,360-61, 552 N.E.2d at 626-27,
553 N.Y.S.2d at 90-91 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
26 See id. at 361, 552 N.E.2d at 627, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting). Judge Kaye indicated that a well developed and significant
body of state law decisions would help settle this area of the law for practitioners and citi-
zens, as well as provide a model for the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdic-
tions. See id. (Kaye, J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 364-65, 552 N.E.2d at 628-29, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 92-93 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Judge Kaye doubted whether the prosecution's reason for excusing the jurors was a legiti-
mate "trial related concern," as required by Batson, since the state has no valid interest in
perpetuating inaccurate translations by official court interpreters. Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting).
2'0 See id. at 363, 552 N.E.2d at 628, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (Kaye, J., dissenting). Pointing
to the prosecutor's failure to determine the Spanish language abilities of any jurors other
than those with Latino surnames, Judge Kaye remained unpersuaded by the prosecution's
articulated reasons. See id. (Kaye, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 363-64, 552 N.E.2d at 628, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (Kaye, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent stipulated that an enhanced inquiry would not necessarily raise a peremptory challenge
to the same level as a challenge for cause, but would reveal the true motivation behind the
excusal of the Latino-surnamed jurors. See id. (Kaye, J., dissenting). According to the dis-
sent, heightened scrutiny should have been required due to the meager record presented by
the prosecution and the "potential for disparate impact" upon Latinos. See id. (Kaye, J.,
dissenting). Latinos, in particular, might be impacted disproportionately by the prosecu-
tion's asserted basis for challenge since most are fluent in Spanish. Id. at 361-62, 552 N.E.2d
at 627, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (Kaye, J., dissenting). Moreover, if the prosecution can excuse
jurors for their fluency in Spanish, Latinos may be excluded disproportionately in cases
where testimony in Spanish is offered. See id. (Kaye, J., dissenting).
31 Cf. CPL § 270.25 commentary at 492-93 (McKinney 1982). In his commentaries to
section 270.25, Judge Bellacosa predicted that it was "highly unlikely that the traditional
historical function will be completely upended or intruded upon so as to add uncertainty,
complexity or delay to this phase of a criminal jury trial." Id.
22 See Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 361, 552 N.E.2d at 627, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (Kaye, J.,
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cal tradition.3 The Hernandez court properly observed that the
United States Supreme Court "carefully modulated" its decision in
Batson to require the prosecution to explain its use of peremptory
challenges34 only after the defendant has established a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. 5 Thus, the Hernandez court's
fear of undermining the nature of peremptory challenges appears
disingenuous since the Batson .framework itself preserves the un-
restricted exercise of peremptories until a prima facie case is es-
tablished. Nevertheless, in the event of a direct collision between
peremptory challenges and constitutional requirements, the former
would inevitably have to give way.8 Moreover, the administrative
burden of implementing a heightened scrutiny standard is not
overwhelming.3 7
Given the sacred position of juries within our constitutional
order and their importance in maintaining the integrity of the ju-
dicial system,3" it is suggested that the Hernandez court erred
when it failed to evaluate the district attorney's explanation for a
prima facie showing of discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges with "enhanced scrutiny." As a result of the holding in Her-
nandez, the criminally accused may find themselves at the mercy
of the prosecutor's discretion in obtaining a jury of their peers.3 9
Kevin C. George
dissenting).
11 See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla.) (where peremptory contains constitu-
tional infirmity, "the constitutional principles must prevail"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219
(1988); State v. Gillmore, 103 N.J. 508, 529, 511 A.2d 1150, 1161 (1986) (peremptory chal-
lenges are "merely a statutory 'incident' of the constitutional right ... [and] must be con-
fined to further, not. . . undermine, the constitutional right").
1, Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 357, 552 N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
35 People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 169, 672 P.2d 854, 859, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77 (1983);
see also Comment, State v. Neih Approaching the Desired Balance Between Peremptory
Challenges and Racial Equality in Jury Selection, 39 U. MiAmi L. Rav. 777, 783 (1985)
("peremptory challenges are exempt from judicial inquiry unless they are based solely on
race").
11 See supra note 33.
37 See Hall, 35 Cal. 3d at 169, 672 P.2d at 859, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
33 See supra note I and accompanying text. The composition of a jury is also important
to the individual defendant because "the peers of a criminal defendant will better under-
stand and empathize with his feelings, social position, and needs than will those from differ-
ent backgrounds." Serr & Maney, supra note 8, at 7.
" See Serr & Maney, supra note 8, at 43. Under the standard announced in Her-
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